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Adelson v. Harris, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 67 (Sept. 27, 2017) (en banc)1
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: FAIR REPORT PRIVILEGE;
ANTI-SLAPP APPLICABILITY
Summary
The Nevada Supreme Court (en banc) held that (1) a hyperlink to source material
concerning a judicial proceeding may qualify as a report within the common law fair report
privilege; and (2) Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute, as effective prior to the 2013 amendment, reaches
communication “aimed at procuring any governmental or electoral action,” even if it is not
addressed to a government agency.
Background
In 2012, the Nevada Jewish Defense Counsel (NJDC) published an online petition asking
then-candidate for U.S. President, Mitt Romney, to reject financial contributions from casinoowner Nathan Adelson. The petition states that Adelson supported and approved of prostitution
taking place at a casino he owns in Macau, China. Specifically, the petition included a hyperlink
to an article published by the Associated Press (AP), which discussed ongoing litigation in Nevada.
The AP article summarizes an affidavit signed by a former CEO of Adelson’s casinos in Macau,
and quotes that a “prostitution strategy had been approved by Adelson.”
Adelson sued the NJDC, and its CEO David Harris, in the Southern District of New York,
alleging defamation. The District Court, after concluding that Nevada law applied, dismissed
Adelson’s complaint, reasoning that the prostitution comment was a report of judicial proceedings
and therefore merited protection by Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute. Adelson appealed to the Second
Circuit, which certified two questions of law to the Nevada Supreme Court.
Discussion
Predicated on the belief that “Nevada citizens have a right to know what transpires in public
and official legal proceedings,”2 the Court reiterated that Nevada “has long recognized a special
privilege of absolute immunity from defamation given to the news media and general public to
report newsworthy events in judicial proceedings.” 3 The Court refers to this immunity by its
commonly used name: fair report privilege.
Fair report privilege, the court emphasized, extends to media and non-media defendants
equally, so long as that person “makes a republication of a judicial proceeding from material that
is available to the general public.”4 The immunity flowing from fair report privilege is absolute—
“preclud[ing] liability even if the defamatory statements are published with knowledge of their
falsity and personal ill will toward the plaintiff.”5
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Determining when a document, which draws upon a source summarizing judicial proceedings,
falls within the fair report privilege
The court adopted the Dameron test, which extends fair report privilege to a document
drawing upon a source summarizing judicial proceedings if the source’s specific attribution, or its
overall context, allows an average reader to determine that the article “is quoting, paraphrasing, or
otherwise drawing upon official documents or proceedings.”6
The hyperlink provides sufficient attribution to turn the petition into a privileged fair report
Noting that Adelson concedes that the underlying AP article is itself protected by fair report
privilege, the Court must only determine whether the hyperlink in the petition attributes
sufficiently to avail itself to fair report privilege. The Court states that the test is whether “a specific
attribution makes it apparent to an average reader that a document draws from judicial
proceedings[.]”
The Court explains that hyperlinks are prevalent online, permit direct access to a source,
and are easy to use. A click on a hyperlink, the Court finds, can enable a reader to instantly
determine whether the underlying source is drawing from judicial proceedings.
However, the Court warns that the utility of a hyperlink as an attributive device is lost if
the average reader cannot identify, open, or understand its importance. To come within the reach
of fair report privilege, a hyperlink must be sufficiently conspicuous.
Conspicuousness and textual explanation
The hyperlink in the petition was sufficiently conspicuous. In this case, the hyperlink,
although not conspicuous in a general sense, was placed in the same sentence as the assertion it
supported. Thus, the hyperlink’s footnote-like quality, the Court explained, rendered it sufficiently
conspicuous of supporting the incendiary comments. Additionally, the particular sentence
containing the easily-accessible hyperlink was written in a way to notify readers that the sentence
was drawing from other sources. These qualities made the hyperlink sufficiently attributable to
come within the protection of Nevada’s fair report privilege.
Nevada’s anti-SLAPP protections include speech that seeks to influence an election but is not
addressed to a government agency
For the second question, the Court directs attention to the recently-decided Delucchi v.
Songer case. There, the Court determined that the legislative history of Nevada’s anti-SLAPP
statute evinces that, before and after the 2013 amendment, the statute did and continues to cover
speech made in furtherance of inducing a government or electoral outcome, notwithstanding
whether it was aimed at a government agency.8 However, said speech must be either “truthful or
[] made without knowledge of its falsehood”9; the Court declined to address whether this was the
case with the petition.
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Dameron v. Wash Magaine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
133 Nev. Adv. Op. 42, 396 P.3d 826 830 (2017).
Id.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.637(1) (1997); see Deluchi v. Songer, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 42, 396 P.3d 826 (2017).
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Conclusion
The hyperlink’s footnote-like quality renders it sufficiently conspicuous to put an average
reader on notice that the petition is drawing from another source summarizing a judicial
proceeding. Thus, the petition is immune from civil liability under Nevada’s fair report privilege.
Additionally, the anti-SLAPP statute, prior to its 2003 amendment, did indeed cover the NJDC
petition insofar as it sought to influence governmental elections or actions without directly
addressing a government entity.
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